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1 Introductory 
The term ‘functionalism’ is usually heard in connection with the philosophy of mind or 
cognition. The functionalism of Wilfrid Sellars, however, is in the first instance as 
response to the worries about the metaphysics not of mental states, but of meaning. 
Only late in his career did Sellars explore the possibility of extending his functionalism 
into an account of cognition. It has been suggested, though, that Sellars’ extension of his 
functionalist theory into subpersonal territory is not successful. In particular, there is a 
worry abroad that in order to be a functionalist about cognitive states, Sellars must 
succumb to a special form of the Myth of the Given. In this essay I will review and 
elucidate what I take to be the structure of Sellars’ functionalism, defending it from this 
worry. I will suggest a resolution of some apparent textual contradictions based in part 
on the chronology of Sellars’ writing, with the assumption that later writings express 
Sellars’ more nuanced views.1  
One of the characteristic features of Sellars’ philosophical style is his apparent 
need to lay out at least a schematic map of a large part of his philosophical system in 
order to properly set the context for any particular point. Consequently, in order to 
sympathetically explain those of his views as are applicable to the contemporary study of 
cognition, I will take a detour through Sellars’ philosophy of language, which is the 
home arena for his functionalism. Some aspects of Sellars’ nominalism will also be 
relevant, though I will forego the formidable task of including serious discussion of that 
topic.2 However, I hope to show that a proper understanding the late Sellars’ views 
                                                 
1 The correlation between time and quality in Sellars’ views is certainly not uncontroversial. The later 
views I will be discussing are sourced primarily from a 1981 paper (1981b), and that great Sellarsian 
philosopher Robert Brandom is fond of expressing his opinion that certainly by 1979 and the writing of 
Naturalism and Ontology Sellars’ thought had progressed from its ‘mature’ phase to its ‘meshuga’ phase. 
A stand-up fight with Brandom on this topic, however, would require covering a lot of ground that is 
quite outside the focus of this paper. Therefore, I must beg the reader’s indulgence, and hope that my 
reading of Sellars stands on its own merits. 
2 Anyway, the core of Sellars’ nominalism seems to be his case for abstract entities being dispensable (cf. 
Seibt 1990 chapter 6, Sellars 1979, chapter 3, and his 1962a). Accordingly, for the purposes of the present 
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about representation requires the acknowledgment of many of his other commitments. 
I will not be concerned here to defend Sellars’ views on language, but if the reader will 
bear with me through this scenic path I will endeavor to illuminate in due course their 
indispensability for understanding Sellars on cognition. 
In section 4 I will return to cognition, discussing an early attempt by Sellars to 
explore the possibilities for functionalism and cognition. In section 5 I will discuss Sellars’ 
mature account of representation and introduce the worry that it confounds the insights 
of the early Sellars. In the last sections I will address this worry by drawing upon the 
compatibility of Sellars’ mature views on representation and his early views on 
normativity, and by gesturing at the connections between the topics I have discussed and 
Sellars’ views on the nature of rational representation. 
2 Rules and Functional Transitions 
Sellars distinguishes priority in the order of being from priority the order of knowing.3 By 
way of illustration, Sellars explains that middle-sized dry goods are prior to 
microphysical processes in the order of knowing; we must become conversant with the 
interactions of tables and billiard balls before we understand our theories of molecular 
bonding or the strong force. Assuming scientific realism, however, the opposite priority 
holds in the order of being: there must actually be such microphysical processes in order 
for there to be tables.4 Likewise, although language is a latecomer in the order of being, 
Sellars claims that our best theories of the mind will presuppose an understanding of the 
structure of language.5 
For Sellars, the starting point for understanding language is reflection on the 
normativity of language. Sellars suggests that “a language is a system of expressions the 
use of which is subject to certain rules,”6 but Sellars employs a somewhat subtle notion 
of rules. Rules, as they concern Sellars, come in two basic flavors. The first, rules of action 
(or ought-to-do rules), are the familiar sort of rule that are satisfied by agents who perform 
specified actions because of the rule. An example of such a rule might be “If one has 
                                                 
discussion, one need not be committed to a nominalist ontology so long as one accepts Sellars’ analysis 
of language (for details, see his 1963). 
3 Cf. 1981b 4–5, 14–15. When I cite Sellars, I will give section numbers for essays in which sections are less 
than a page length, and page numbers (usually from Scharp and Brandom) otherwise. 
4 That is, it is necessary that there be such microphysical processes, and it is necessary that they be the 
specific microphysical processes of the theory (assuming the theory is true). This point should be familiar 
to readers of Kripke (1980). 
5 Sellars 1981b § 5 
6 Sellars 1954 § 1 
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made a promise, one ought to keep it.”7 The second flavor of rule is that of rules of 
criticism (or ought-to-be rules), such as “Clocks ought to strike on the quarter hour,” or 
“One ought to feel sympathy for the bereaved.”8 There is a kind of correctness involved 
in conforming to rules of criticism, but it is not the correctness of actions.9 Clocks cannot 
act, and feeling sympathy is not an action, so the strong (ought-to-do) sense of 
normativity cannot be in play in these cases. Nevertheless, there is a more subtle kind of 
correctness that belongs to clocks and the sympathetic. And this subtle correctness does 
not come into play when chalk falls or salt dissolves. 
Sellars does hold that “learning to use a language is learning to obey the rules for 
the use of its expressions”10—i.e. that becoming a mature user of language necessarily 
involves the grasp of rules of action. 11  However, not all linguistic behavior can be 
characterized as action,12 and many linguistic rules (though not all) are rules of criticism.13 
Rules of criticism can be observed by what Sellars calls pattern-governed behavior, which 
is 
behavior that exhibits pattern, not because it is brought about by the 
intention that it exhibit this pattern, but because the propensity to emit 
behavior of the pattern has been selectively reinforced, and the propensity 
to emit behavior which does not conform to this pattern selectively 
extinguished.14 
Thus the correctness of a well-maintained clock is pattern-governed, for the precise 
timing of the clock’s chiming is selected for by the combined efforts of its designer, its 
maker and its keeper. Likewise the specific patterns of bee dances, whereby scouts 
communicate to foragers how to find food, are selected for by the environmental 
influences on the degree to which the transmission of genetic material to later 
                                                 
7 I am not proposing an analysis of promise-keeping in terms of rules of action—I am not sure that a 
promise ‘kept’ unintentionally is not truly kept. 
8 Sellars 1969 pp. 59–61 
9 Sellars 1974 p. 87. Sellars is talking about pattern-governed behavior in that passage and not rules of 
criticism as such, but I think his expressions can be unproblematically extended in light of the relation he 
supposes between those two notions and the common examples employed in their explication. 
10 Sellars 1954 § 1 
11 This claim of Sellars’ is related to his claims about the development of children, mentioned in section 7 
of this essay. 
12 Sellars 1969 pp. 61–62. Cf. also his 1967 §§ 35–36. 
13 Sellars 1969 p. 61, and 1968 § 42. It has to be the case that some linguistic rules are rules of criticism, 
since if obeying rules of action presupposes understanding of the rule, and understanding the rule 
presupposes a grasp of language, then the view that all linguistic rules are rules of action threatens a 
regress. Cf. Sellars 1954. 
14 Sellars 1974 p. 86. Cf. also Sellars 1954 §§ 12 –17. 
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generations is successful. The constant acceleration of a falling body, on the other hand, 
is not selected for by intentional, social or natural pressure, and is therefore not pattern-
governed, nor is it subject to rules of criticism. Sellars’ view is that while many proprieties 
and intricacies of language use turn on rules of action, the rules that contribute to 
language’s meaningfulness and its status as the medium of thought are rules of 
criticism,15 that are satisfied not only by the actions of agents but by pattern-governed 
behavior. 
On Sellars’ account, the patterns that are constitutive of linguistic meaning 
involve the occupation by language users of “positions in a language game.”16 Sellars 
cashes out the notion of being in such a ‘position’ not in the Wittgensteinian way,17 but 
as ‘saying that-p or having the short-term propensity to say that-p.’18 Sellars draws special 
attention to three kinds of pattern-governed linguistic behavior. First, language-entry 
transitions involve the occupation by a language user of a position in a language game as 
a response to a state of affairs that is not itself a position in a language game. 19 The 
paradigmatic language-entry transitions are those from sensation to observation 
sentences. Second, intra-linguistic transitions involve the movement from one position 
in a language game to another, as by a material or formal inference.20 Finally, language-
exit transitions21 involve the movement of a language user from a position in a language 
game, to a state that is not itself a position in the language game. The transformation of 
practical intentions into actions are paradigmatic such transitions.22 
The upshot of Sellars’ functionalism is that there is a dimension of meaning that 
is properly characterized as a sort of functional classification within a system of such 
classifications. Such a system may be called, in the more contemporary idiom, a 
functional economy, or simply an economy.  The various functional items in the economy 
are referred to by dot-quoted expressions, whose full analysis involves the specification 
                                                 
15 Sellars 1969 pp. 61–62, 1981b §§ 10–11 
16 Cf. Sellars 1954, esp. §§ 10, 16, 19ff  
17 That is to say that language games for Sellars are not little institutions like guessing riddles, singing 
catches or following orders (cf. Wittgenstein § 23), but “the ‘game’ of reasoning” (Sellars 1954 § 31). 
18 That is, occupying a position in a language game is cashed out for Sellars in terms of his verbal 
behaviourism—cf. Sellars 1974 p. 83. 
19 The details of what is involved in such a transition is of course controversial (and Sellars himself 
discusses the complexities involved in such transitions in his famous 1956), but undoubtedly there are 
such transitions. In ignoring the details of what these and the other linguistic transitions consist in, I do 
not mean to suggest that either Sellars or I think that these details are simple or unimportant. 
20 Cf. Sellars 1953 
21 Sellars seems to favor the expression ‘language-departure transition’ (cf. his 1954, 1974), but use of the 
term ‘language-exit transition’ seems to have become standard in the literature (cf. Scharp & Brandom’s 
introduction, deVries 2005 p. 31, Rosenberg 2007b pp. 51, 157, 179). 
22 Sellars 1954 p. 36. 
 Akagi 5 
of rules of criticism governing functional transitions—system-entry, intra-system, and 
system-exit—of functional complexes that include the item to be analyzed. Finally, these 
transitions are not satisfied by mere regularities or intentional actions per se, but are 
normative in the subtle sense that is satisfied by ‘pattern-governed behavior.’ 
3 Dot-Quotation and Functional Classification 
One of the powerful bits of analytic technology Sellars brings to bear on this picture is 
the quotation mark. Sellars claims that quotation marks are used to create novel sortal 
predicates (common nouns) out of linguistic exemplars, but cautions that “to think that 
quoting is simply a device for formulating illustrating names of sign-designs is to take far 
too myopic a view of the power of quotation marks.”23 The criteria of ascription for 
these novel predicates can be based on (say) phonological or typographical similarity to 
the quoted expression, but they can also be based on functional similarity to the quoted 
expression, where the notion of functional similarity is cashed out in terms of patterns 
of language-entry, intra-linguistic and language-exit transitions. When Sellars forms 
functional sortals, he marks his intentions typographically with the use of dot-quotes. 
If one accepts this picture of meaning as functional classification, then one is in 
a position to appreciate one of Sellars’ favorite contentions: that the ‘means’ in 
statements like  
‘Rot’ in German means red 
does not express a relation between a word and anything—be it an abstract universal, or 
actual or possible red things, or what have you. Rather, the ‘means’ in such statements 
is properly analyzed as a special instance of the copula.24 Such a statement should be 
understood to mean that German ‘rot’s are (in some sense) ‘red’s, though this can’t be 
quite right since the German word ‘rot’ is not identical to the English word ‘red.’25 Sellars 
analyzes a ‘means’ statement like that above as 
‘Rot’s in German are •reds•. 
That is, that the word ‘rot’ in German has the function of being a •red•, which we are to 
understand as being an item that in its language has the function that ‘red’s have in 
English. “Roughly to say what an expression means is to classify it functionally by means 
                                                 
23 Sellars 1981b § 29 
24 Sellars 1974 p. 95 
25 Sellars 1981b § 28 
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of an illustrating sortal.”26  Ultimately, dot-quoted expressions are promissory notes 
backed by the possibility of exhaustively articulating the ‘functional roles’ that are 
denoted by dot-quoted sortals in terms of the linguistic rules that govern the proprieties 
of their use. That is, in terms of the language-entry, intra-linguistic, and language-exit 
transitions that are associated with or inconsistent with expressions that include the 
functional sortal denoted.27 
It is important to recognize that functional classification is sensitive to 
contextual factors, for the propriety of asserting a functional similarity between 
expressions may depend on our interest in it. So Sellars suggests that 
What counts as an •or• in one classificatory context may be classified as like 
an •or• in another. If Germans were to use ‘oder’ only in the inclusive sense, 
and we were to use ‘or’ only in the exclusive sense, we might, nevertheless, 
for some purposes, classify ‘oder’s as •or•s…28 
Sellars explains that if this were the case, the expression •or• could function as a generic 
sortal, of which inclusive and exclusive or would be species, though in English we would 
only have an illustrative term for the exclusive species. 29  Alternatively, “in other 
contexts”30 it might be proper to constrain our use of ‘•or•’ to indicate the exclusive 
connective for which we have the straightforward exemplar. Presumably this context-
sensitivity should be cashed out in terms of our interest at different times in certain 
transition patterns rather than others. This dimension of contextual variability for 
functional sortals should hardly be surprising, since one of their paradigmatic 
applications is for analyses of ‘means’ statements like those characteristic of inter-
linguistic translation, and the proper translation of expressions between languages 
depends on the context. To take a contrived example, the French expression ‘Parfois il 
faut voler’ can be translated into English, in different scenarios, as ‘Sometimes you have 
to fly,’ or as ‘Sometimes you have to steal.’ A more serious example might be the Japanese 
expression ‘すみません’31 which in different contexts functions as an English ‘excuse 
me’ or as an English ‘I’m sorry.’ Thus in one case we might justifiably claim that ‘すみ
ません’s are •excuse me•s, and in another case that ‘すみません’s are •I’m sorry•s 
without thereby holding that •excuse me•s are •I’m sorry•s, either in English, in Japanese, 
                                                 
26 Sellars 1974 p. 95 
27 Sellars 1974 p. 96 
28 Sellars 1974 p.92n12 
29 Cf. also Sellars’ discussions of functional genera and species in his 1974 pp. 98–99 
30 Sellars 1974 p.92n12 
31 in Roman characters: ‘sumimasen’ 
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or in general. Dot-quoted sortals are promissory not only in that they are implicitly 
backed by patterns of language-entry, intra-linguistic and language-exit transitions, but 
also in that the truth of statements that employ dot-quoted sortals are subject to the 
same dimension of context-sensitivity as ‘means’ statements. Furthermore, this context-
sensitivity of dot-quoted expressions generates tension between the vague and 
ambiguous functional sortals denoted by dot-quoted expressions, and strict functional 
sortals articulated only in terms of functional transitions. 
 4 Picturing and Anthropoid Robots 
Sellars readily applied this functional account to language and to thought,32 but was for 
some time apparently reluctant to extend his functionalism to other (e.g. neural) 
contexts. Sellars’ reluctance reflects his well-known respect for the conceptual hazards 
surrounding the mind-body problem. Sellars’ most famous essay 33  is remembered 
chiefly for its warnings about the Myth of the Given, the philosopher’s fantasy that there 
are states that, like sensations, are non-conceptual as well as rationally significant, like 
beliefs. The Myth of the Given is one of the many hazards that occupy the frontier 
between the world of causal interactions, and the space of rational relations.34 In “Being 
and Being Known,” (“BBK”) 35  Sellars distinguished between two kinds of 
representational isomorphism, called picturing and signification, which inhabit different 
sides of this frontier.36 Signification is an isomorphism between rational notions, and is 
the sort of relationship for which we are supposed to give the non-relational analysis of 
meaning glossed above. That is, a statement such as 
                                                 
32 The best short treatment of Sellars’ account of meaning in language and thought, in his own 
estimation, was his 1974 (1979 p. viii). 
33 undoubtedly his 1956 
34 For clarity, I have taken the liberty of denoting the alternate sides (the causal and the rational) of this 
frontier with my own terms. Sellars himself uses an enormous variety of expressions. In his 1960 he refers 
to the ‘logical order,’ ‘intentional order,’ or ‘conceptual order’ on the one hand, and the ‘real order’ or 
‘material order’ on the other. In his 1979 he adds ‘natural order’ to the latter list. On my reading, these 
‘orders’ more or less correspond to the ‘manifest image’ and the ‘scientific image,’ respectively (Sellars 
1962b), although that correspondence is not uncontroversial or without its complications. Moreover, 
Sellars’ reference to ‘orders’ creates confusion when mixed with his distinction between the ‘order of 
knowing’ and the ‘order of being’ in his 1981b, which is not obviously the same distinction—the latter 
distinction refers to orderings of priority rather than something like realms of discourse. I have decided 
to preserve Sellars’ terminology in the latter context at the expense of preserving his terminologies in the 
former contexts because it is Sellars’ later usage, and because it is easier to find synonyms for ‘order’ when 
(as in the earlier usage) it means something like ‘realm’ rather than ‘sequence.’ Ultimately, I thought that 
this replacement in exposition does the least violence to Sellars’ views. 
35 Sellars 1960 
36 Sellars 1960 § 32 
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In German ‘Mensch’ signifies man 
should be analyzed not as a relation between the sign design ‘Mensch’ and the entity 
denoted by ‘man’ (men or manhood or whatever), but as a functional isomorphism 
between the word ‘Mensch’ and the functional sortal exemplified by the English word 
‘man.’37 In other words, the claim that 
‘Mensch’ signifies man, 
should, in the manner of ‘means’ statements, be understood as the claim that 
‘Mensch’s are •man•s, 
where to be a •man• is cashed out in terms of language-entry, intra-linguistic and 
language-exit transitions. 
Picturing, on the other hand, is a matter-of-factual, not a rational or normative 
isomorphism. To explicate this notion, Sellars considers “the anthropoid robots of the 
future”38 which are self-moving, have sophisticated wiring diagrams, and are equipped 
with radio and radar sensors and memory tapes. By printing on and reading from its tape, 
a robot creates and accesses representations of its environment and itself, which mediate 
its behavior. Thus the tape records the robot’s ‘observations,’ ‘inferences’ and 
‘intentions’ as it goes about its business. 39  These representations, Sellars claims, are 
‘pictures’ of the robot’s environment. The representations that participate in picturing, 
however, are to be construed merely as physical marks, though ones with special causal 
powers for the robot due to their place in the complex context of the robot’s inner 
machinery. Sellars calls such physical objects thus construed natural-linguistic objects.40 
Picturing, then, is a kind of isomorphism that holds between a bit of the world (say, 
lightning) and such a natural-linguistic object. 
Sellars claims that the logical structure of ‘picturing’ statements such as 
‘::’ pictures lightning41 
                                                 
37 Sellars 1960 §§ 45–50, and § 52n13. Sellars had not yet developed all his apparatus (such as the use of 
dot-quotes to form functional sortals) but his discussion is a clear precursor to later ones, e.g. in his 1964. 
38 Sellars 1960 § 36 
39 Sellars 1960 § 37–39 
40 Sellars 1962c p. 212, and duplicated in 1979 p. 136 
41 Sellars sometimes uses asterisk-quotes to create sortals based on physical similarity to a linguistic 
exemplar (e.g. in his 1963, cf. e.g. pp. 163–164n3). Since I only use such sortals in connection with 
picturing, however, contextual cues make such marking unnecessary. 
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is not to be understood along the functionalist lines outlined above. Unlike the analysis 
of signification statements, the ‘pictures’ in a statement like that above does express a 
relation between a sign design and some bit of the world.42 This is not to say that a 
symbol on the robot’s tape cannot also signify. Depending on just how sophisticated the 
robot is, we might wish to claim that 
‘::’ signifies lightning, 
meaning that 
‘::’s are •lightning•s. 
But there are some qualifications. For one, we would make signification claims in virtue 
of a construal of ‘::’s as symbols rather than as natural-linguistic objects. For another, 
Sellars claims that we are only tempted to make such claims in virtue of our recognition 
that ‘::’s (as natural-linguistic objects) picture lightning—that there is an isomorphism 
between these marks in the context of the robot’s wiring diagram and interactions, and 
instances of lightning in the context of the robot’s environment. 
In this sense we can say that isomorphism in the [causal realm] between the 
robot’s electronic system and its environment is a presupposition of 
isomorphism in the [rational realm] between robotese and the language we 
speak.43 
That is to say that in the order of being, picturing-isomorphisms are prior to related 
signification-isomorphisms; the existence of the former is a necessary condition for the 
existence of the latter. Since Sellars’ anthropoid robot is clearly a stand-in for human 
bodies conceived as complex physical systems,44 the suggestion seems to be that the 
firing-patterns of neurons (or whatever) picture bits of our environments. Furthermore, 
although it is in virtue of this picturing that our symbols signify, neuron-firings qua 
natural-linguistic objects cannot themselves be said to signify. 
But which isomorphisms count as picturings? One might suggest that any causal 
isomorphism you manage to find—even one between the win-loss record of a college 
                                                 
42 Sellars 1960 § 40 
43 Sellars 1960 § 53. “Causal realm” and “rational realm” have been substituted for “real order” and 
“order of signification.” 
44 This suggestion is reinforced by Sellars’ claim in the same essay that “the intellect as belonging to the 
real order… is the central nervous system” (1960 § 59). Cf. also Sellars 1962b: “the scientific image of man 
turns out to be that of a complex physical system” (p. 393). 
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football team and the growth rate of a tree in Cleveland—counts as a picturing. But this 
is not what Sellars has in mind. Sellars claims that “the patterns on the tape do not 
picture the robot’s environment merely by virtue of being patterns on the tape.” Rather, 
the symbols on the tape are like a map, which is only a map at all by virtue of a method 
of projection. Sellars’ illustrative example is the inner surface of the groove of a 
phonograph record, which can be said to picture a sound or a performance. However, 
the sense in which the groove of an LP pictures a sound depends upon the phonograph’s 
‘method of projection’ from the groove to the sound, and “cannot be abstracted from” 
it.45 Likewise, the natural-linguistic objects on the robot’s tape picture only in virtue of 
the rest of the robot, which (in this context) serves as a method of projection from the 
information on the tape to the intelligent behavior of the robot. 
I do not plan to object to this Sellarsian story as far as it goes, but it is misleading. 
From ‘BBK’ it would be easy to presume that in Sellars’ view there are two sorts of 
representational isomorphism, differentiated by whether they concern rational symbols 
or natural-linguistic objects, and that Sellars’ claim about them is that the former are 
functional and the latter are relational. That is, it would be easy to read Sellars as claiming 
that whereas representational isomorphisms in the rational realm are functional, 
representational isomorphisms in the causal realm are relational. I will suggest that this 
is not Sellars’ view. That picturing is a non-rational isomorphism does not imply that all 
isomorphisms between non-rational items are picturings.46 After all, Sellars provides no 
argument that picturings are relational; he stipulates that when he is discussing picturing, 
he is discussing a causal isomorphism that it is relational.47 This stipulation is followed 
up quickly by a qualification that a picture is only a picture in virtue of its relation to a 
‘mode of projection.’ I read Sellars’ later writing on representation as the development 
of his thought in ‘BBK’ and elsewhere. Specifically, Sellars’ account of animal 
representation develops the possibility, already present in his synoptic view so far 
described, of functional characterization for non-rational systems.  
5 Mapping and Animal Representation Systems  
Sellars proposes his account of animal representation in a late essay entitled “Mental 
Events” (“MEV”).48  A representational system (RS) represents objects as being of a 
                                                 
45 Sellars 1960 § 40 
46 It would be a misreading of Sellars’ mature position, anyway. Whatever Sellars’ thoughts in 1960 may 
have been, he did go on to develop a more nuanced account of representation in the natural realm 
(1981b) while continuing to develop his account of picturing in his 1968 and his 1979. 
47 In Sellars 1960 § 40 
48 Sellars 1981b 
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certain character or as related in some way. The RS does this by way of symbols that 
stand for objects, and conventional signs—possibly concatenations with other symbols, 
e.g. predicates, or modifications of the object-symbols, e.g. printing them with a 
distinctive typeface or spatial arrangement49—with which that character or relation is 
indicated. 50  Maps, for example, use such spatial and typographical conventions to 
represent locations as having certain characters (Chicago as being a metropolis) or as 
related in certain ways (Chicago as northeast of Urbana).51 On this definition, RSs are 
fairly common—animals and humans are RSs, as are maps and languages. A person 
reading place-names from a map involves multiple layered RSs, or perhaps one RS with 
lots of moving parts. But not all RSs are equal; for example, “the map is a parasitical RS. 
It depends for its mappishness on its use by human RSs.”52 This is because a map is no 
map at all without a mode of projection. This is not the same as requiring that a map be 
actually used; a map is a map whether or not it is ever used, but it cannot be a map if 
there is no way to use it.53 
Animal RSs are a relatively sophisticated subset of RSs, because they are self-
sufficient in the way that maps and phonograph records are not. An animal RS is a 
“perceiving—inferring—remembering—wanting—acting organism.” 54  On Sellars’ 
view, a representational state of an animal represents only in virtue of its place in the 
animal’s RS, and is in some sense like a map: 
to be a representational state, a state of an organism must be the 
manifestation of a system of dispositions and propensities by virtue of 
which the organism constructs maps of itself in its environment, and locates 
itself and its behavior on the map.55 
                                                 
49 Cf. also Sellars’ discussions of the perspicuous logical language ‘Jumblese’ in his 1962a, 1963 IX (pp. 
192–195), 1979 p. 133. 
50 Sellars 1981b § 47 
51 Sellars 1979 p. 133. Indeed, Sellars says “the map belongs to a Jumblese dialect” (ibid). 
52 Sellars 1981b § 62 
53 Cf. Sellars 1979 chapter 5 § 77 (p. 134) 
54 Sellars 1981b § 71. Sellars’ original passage indicated that any RS is a ‘primitive or sophisticated form’ of 
such an organism. However, it is difficult to construe, say, a literal map (again, as one of Michigan) as 
such an organism by itself. On my reading, the sophisticated RSs are those that are ‘perceiving—
inferring—remembering—wanting—acting organisms’ that do not require other such organisms to 
perceive, infer, remember, want, or act. So both literal maps and animal representational states 
(figurative maps) are relatively ‘primitive’ RSs, whereas organisms are relatively sophisticated, and 
humans are particularly sophisticated. 
55 Sellars 1981b § 56 
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An animal RS is essentially a map-making and map-using device, and its representations 
are its maps. Sellars proposes two requirements that a state must satisfy to count as a 
map for an RS: it must be “structurally similar” to the location mapped,56 and it and 
other map-states must be 
so connected with each other and with the [animal RS]’s locomotor activity 
that together they constitute what can not too metaphorically be 
characterized as a strategy for finding [the location].”57 
The first requirement, of structural similarity, is the requirement that a map picture 
whatever it is a map of. The second requirement, of having a role in the behavior of an 
animal RS, is the requirement that there be a suitable mode of projection for the picture. 
For a map is a parasitical RS that requires a mode of projection (a self-sufficient RS) for 
its mappishness. This mode of projection is a ‘strategy’ for finding represented objects 
that essentially involves the manipulation of related representational states (e.g. of smoke 
and fire) that are in turn geared to the sensational and behavioral capacities of the 
organism.58 This second requirement, however, seems to suggest that there can be a 
functional account of picturing,59 since it is only in virtue of the function of a natural-
linguistic object in the activity of a sophisticated representational system that it can be 
said to picture at all. 
Indeed, Sellars himself suggests that a functionalist characterization can be 
extended to non-linguistic RSs. Since Sellars applied his non-relational analysis of 
meaning not only to linguistic items but to thoughts, he sees no reason not to extend the 
non-relational analysis to representational states. Thus: 
functional sortals apply not only to expressions in any language which play 
in that language a relevantly similar role to that played in our language by 
the dot-quoted expression, but, as we can now put it, to representational 
states in any RS which play in that RS the relevantly similar role in 
question.60 
Sellars seems to bring the whole battery of applications of his functionalist account to 
bear on the analysis of animal representational states: 
                                                 
56 Sellars 1981b § 63 
57 Sellars 1981b § 64 
58 Sellars 1981b §§ 66–69 
59 Though the sense in which it is a functional account of ‘picturing’ is qualified by Sellars’ observation 
of the ‘notorious “ing-ed” ambiguity’ (1956 § 24), as I will discuss below in section 6. 
60 Sellars 1981b § 76 
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If… there is a relevant degree of similarity between the functioning of a 
certain state, φ, of an animal’s representational system and the function of 
‘this is triangular’ in our own representational system, then we can 
appropriately say 
φ-states mean this is triangular 
φ-states stand for (the proposition) that this is triangular 
i.e. 
φ-states are •this is triangular•s61 
Sellars thereby countenances the possibility of applying his functional analysis of 
language and thought to the representational states of creatures that do not have 
language. 
However, there is a worry abroad62 that in extending his functional analysis to 
causal states, Sellars (of all people) has run afoul of the Myth of the Given. The provision 
of a functional analysis for causally-described systems apparently conflicts with Sellars’ 
claims in “BBK.” Presumably, the anthropoid robot is a sophisticated (self-sufficient) 
RS, and we are to consider the marks on its tape, which picture the robot’s environment, 
to be its representational states. Now, we can consider the robot’s tape-states as symbols, 
in which context it is licit to analyze their content according to Sellars’ functional 
account, e.g. that ‘::’s are •lightning•s. However, if animals are not rational creatures, one 
might suppose that animal RSs as such are causal RSs. Just as the anthropoid robot can 
be conceived as a rational or as a causal system, the animal RSs that are ‘innate 
endowments’63 of human RSs are human RSs construed causally.64 The physiological 
states of an animal RS would then be natural-linguistic objects, not symbols as such, and 
could not be said to signify. If states of animal RSs, φ-states, are natural-linguistic objects 
belonging to the causal realm, they cannot serve as •this is triangular•s, which are ex 
hypothesi positions in the “game of reasoning,” and therefore states in rational space. Or, 
to once again pit the early Sellars against the Sellars of “MEV,” describing something as 
a state of an animal RS is giving it an empirical description, and 
                                                 
61 Sellars 1981b § 36. It is significant, however, that in this particular passage Sellars’ extension of 
functional characterizations is conditional. Sellars will qualify his stance on propositions later, in § 77 of 
the same essay. 
62 I take this worry to be one shared by Ulf Hlobil and Robert Brandom (Brandom 2009, part one). 
63 Sellars 1981b § 57 
64 I do not mean to claim that Sellars actually uses the notion of an ‘animal representational system’ in 
this limiting sense, but since it is a perspicuous way to state the worry I will continue to talk of animal 
RSs in contrast to rational (e.g. human) RSs. 
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in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving 
an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the 
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one 
says.65 
I contend that the Sellars of “MEV” does not make these errors. My vindication 
of this Sellars by the lights of the “BBK” Sellars will proceed in three phases. First I will 
qualify, and thereby begin to flesh out, Sellars’ claims about animal representation. 
Second, I will illuminate the connections between Sellars’ early views on normativity and 
the possibility he explores in “MEV.” I will conclude that if Sellars has gone wrong in 
“MEV,” the roots of his late error were present (indeed, prominent) in his early 66 
philosophy of language. If Sellars’ later development of his functionalism is flawed, then, 
it is not because it conflicts with the account he gave earlier in his career. Finally, in 
section 7, I will gesture at Sellars’ positive story about what there must be in the order of 
being for there to be full-blooded rational representation. 
6 Normativity and Pattern-Governed Behavior 
Recall that in section 3 I observed the tension between functional classification by dot-
quotation and functional classification by articulating transitional patterns. Sellars 
returns to this theme in “MEV,” making an important concession that illuminates this 
cleavage between dot-quotation and transitional patterns. It is the latter that are the 
essence of Sellars’ functionalism. The device of dot-quotation is a useful trick, indeed a 
powerful analytic tool, but it depends for its value on prior patterns of language-entry, 
intra-linguistic and language-exit transitions. Dot-quotation allows the easy formation 
of functional sortals based on a linguistic exemplar from our language, but its 
application is limited to states of systems that are ‘relevantly similar’ to exemplars of our 
language. Functional sortals formed through dot-quotation must be backed by the 
possibility of articulating the transitional patterns that are associated with or 
inconsistent with instances of the sortal. Thus Sellars cautions us: 
                                                 
65 Sellars 1956 § 36 
66 By which I mean that the possibility of Sellarsian ‘animal cognition’ emerges from Sellars’ 
development of his notion of ‘pattern-governed behavior,’ which appears in his 1954—one of the earliest 
essays of his that I cite. 
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That it might not be possible to formulate [specific functional 
classifications] by the use of the dot-quoting technique serves only to 
remind us that the latter, however useful, is merely a useful dodge.67 
Sellars’ acknowledgement of this ‘dodge’ opens up a space in his view for ‘functional’ 
systems that are quite different from our language, or from language at all. To be sure, 
Sellars still holds that we understand functional systems by analogy with language, but 
the analogy need not concern the content of particular functional items; it may merely 
concern the relational structure that those items have in a system. That is, we may 
understand some functional systems not because we can compare their items to 
functional sortals of English, but because like English their functions are determined by 
patterns of system-entry, intra-system and system-exit transitions. 
Sellars addresses some of the gaps that arise between language and animal RSs, 
for his willingness to find •this is triangular•s in the RS of, say, a rat is not ipso facto a 
willingness to attribute to the rat’s RS states which function for the rat exactly as •this is 
triangular•s do for, say, geometers. Sellars introduces the rat by remarking on the 
(somewhat bizarre) case of a rat that has “acquired the propensity to leap at panels with 
varieties of triangles painted on them.”68 A rat that leaps selectively at triangles would 
seem to have in its RS a representational state that functions in some respects (perhaps 
only for a subset of system-entry transitions) like ‘this is triangular’s in English. So we 
might be perfectly willing, for some purposes, to grant that the rat’s RS contains •this is 
triangular•s. However, Sellars remarks that 
a much greater degree of integration of responses to triangles as triangles 
into the rat’s RS is required before we can appropriately say that the rat has 
even the most primitive concept of a triangle. Primitive inferences would 
also be involved. Thus a rat’s φ-state wouldn’t be a state of representing 
something as a triangle unless it had the propensity to move from the φ-
state to another state which counts as a primitive form of representing it as 
3-sided or as having, say, pointed edges.69 
So at this point Sellars has found •this is triangular• states in the rat’s RS,70 but claims 
that more showing is required before we can also find •triangular• states in the rat’s RS. 
                                                 
67 Sellars 1981b § 77n9 
68 Sellars 1981b § 54 
69 Sellars 1981b § 58 
70 Sellars does not mention the rat in the above-quoted passage from 1981b § 36, but mentions the rat 
when alluding to that passage in § 77. 
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Depending on our interest in the rat and in •triangular•s, we may take the intra-linguistic 
transition from •x is triangular• to •x is trilateral• is a fairly essential transition. 
Additionally, we may seriously doubt that a rat’s RS can be meaningfully said to contain 
•trilateral•s that are distinguishable from and generally preceded or followed by 
•triangular•s. In such a case, although we grant that the rat’s RS contains •this is 
triangular•s, we may very well deny that the rat’s RS contains •triangular•s, since, for 
example, the rat’s understanding of triangles is too primitive for it to be capable of 
learning congruence theorems. 
In fact, Sellars even withholds attribution to the rat’s RS of states that function 
as the proposition that this is triangular.71 That is to say that Sellars allows that the rat 
has states that function as instances of ‘this is triangular’ in English, but not states that 
function as the expression kind of which they are instances. Sellars analyzes propositions 
not as sortal predicates formed from sentences (e.g. ‘•this is triangular•’), but as 
distributive singular terms, which he indicates by prefixing ‘the’ to a sortal predicate, e.g. 
‘the lion’ in ‘the lion is a mammal.’72 So while Sellars suggests that the animal RS of his 
trained rat has states that are •this is triangular•s, he does not take the rat’s RS to have 
states that are •the •this is triangular••s.73 
So Sellars does respect important limitations to the extension of his 
functionalism to causal contexts. Animal RSs can contain states that function as 
sentences for a linguistic RS, but it is often less plausible that they contain states that 
function relevantly like words, and unless they are rational (i.e. distinctively human) RSs 
they cannot contain states that function as propositions (though I will put off until 
section 7 the elaboration of this last point). 
In so qualifying Sellars’ extension of his functionalism, however, I have not yet 
defused the worry I mentioned. The early Sellars was wary of confusing items construed 
rationally with items construed causally, e.g. symbols with natural-linguistic objects. The 
worriers ask: doesn’t Sellars, even in this qualified and limited extension, confuse φ-states 
                                                 
71 Sellars 1981b § 77. In fact, though, Sellars is frustratingly vague and inconsistent. Sellars does seem to 
suggest earlier in § 36 that states of the rat RS can ‘stand for’ propositions, and in § 77 Sellars suggests 
that in that earlier passage he observed the qualification I am articulating about sentences vs. 
propositions, though he did not. However, the interpretation I offer is consistent with Sellars’ 
commitments (as I read him), and with the place of § 77 in the flow of Sellars’ essay—between his 
explicit extension of functional characterization to animal RSs, and his explanation of the difference 
between Humean and Aristotelian RSs. 
72 Cf. e.g. Sellars 1962a p. 9, 1963 pp. 166–167 
73 Cf. Sellars 1963 (e.g. pp. 179) for the gritty details of this analysis. I take his revision of ‘the •x is 
triangular•’ to ‘the (•triangular•INDCON)’ (cf. pp. 195ff) to apply to his analysis of logical variables, 
rather than expressions for which there are suitable illustrative sortals (e.g. •this• for ‘this,’ rather than 
INDCON for ‘x’). 
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as symbols with φ-states as natural-linguistic objects? That is, Sellars’ extension of his 
functional analysis to animal RSs seems to rely on an equivocation about whether 
representational states of animal RSs are causally-individuated items or potential moves 
in the ‘space of reasons.’ I contend that Sellars has not made this error, at least not by the 
lights of the early Sellars. If Sellars has run afoul of the Myth of the Given, he did not do 
so when he extended his functional analysis to animal RSs in “MEV,” but when he laid 
the normative groundwork for his account of language before “BBK.” Sellars 
countenanced the possibility of a functionalist science of cognition when he made the 
functional proprieties of language a matter of the observance of rules of criticism. If 
functional-transitional proprieties can be satisfied in the way that rules of criticism can 
be satisfied, then any pattern-governed behavior has the right normative character to be 
characterized functionally. According to Sellars, then, rats and bees and clocks and 
anthropoid robots, no less than language and thought, are amenable to functional 
characterization. 
In short, the worry raised above is right-headed in that it demands of 
functionalist systems that their transitions be normative and not mere regularities. 
However, my diagnosis is that the worry is wrong-headed in that it overlooks the subtle 
sense of normativity—that which accompanies rules of criticism rather than rules of 
action—that Sellars imputes to language as a representational system. Like language, in 
which the inferential articulation of an expression is constitutive of the meaning of the 
expression, the ‘inferential’ articulation of a representational state in terms of system-
entry, intra-system and system-exit transitions is constitutive of the content of the 
representational state. What a representational state pictures is determined by the 
functional classification of that state within an RS. The demarcation between rational 
and non-rational RSs does not coincide with the demarcation between systems that are 
amenable to functionalist characterization and those that are not. So Sellars does allow 
in “MEV” that natural-linguistic objects can be items in a functional economy, and 
therefore that they can in principle be denoted by dot-quoted expressions. But he does 
not thereby admit any natural-linguistic objects into the space of reasons. 
The trick is that although signification-isomorphisms ex hypothesi can only hold 
between symbols in the realm of rationality, dot-quotation is not so limited. Dot-
quotation trades on functional isomorphisms, and since functional systems come in 
both rational and non-rational flavors, dot-quotation can span the gulf between the 
world of causes and the space of reasons. However, there are certain kinds of functional 
isomorphisms (e.g. between propositions) that cannot hold across this gulf, and Sellars 
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identifies the snag as one of the important conditions (in the order of being) of the 
possibility of rational thought.74 
The Sellars of “MEV” proposes a functional account of picturing, and one that 
does not conflict with his claim in “BBK” that picturing-isomorphisms are to be 
understood in the logic of relations and not according to the functionalist analysis that 
belongs in the first instance (though not exclusively) to signification-isomorphisms. This 
maneuver is possible because of Sellars’ care about “the notorious ‘ing-ed’ ambiguity.”75 
There are two things we call representations: representings, or episodes in which 
representation occurs, and representeds, or the content of a representational episode. 
Sellars is not proposing a functional account of pictureds. The content of picturing 
episodes is still to be understood as a relation between the structure of the picture and 
the structure of what is pictured. So a map of Michigan pictures Michigan because of 
the isomorphism between the structure of the symbols on the map, and the structure of 
locations in Michigan. However, the means by which picturing episodes are made 
possible, the preconditions of picturings in the order of being, are to be understood for 
animal RSs in the context of an RS construed as a natural-functional system. So that the 
map is contentful at all depends upon there being a mode of projection, a way of reading 
the map to guide one’s movements in Michigan more or less successfully. 
Sellars’ account is of a sort of picture-sandwich on a functionalist bun, only the 
top of which is sprinkled with the toasted sesame seeds of rationality. Rational-
functional patterns of the sort that animate the meanings of thoughts and linguistic 
expressions, and that back translation statements and signification-isomorphisms, 
                                                 
74 Sellars does not revisit ‘signification’ in his later essays, so in fact there is room for dispute about how 
and whether to apply the notion to what I have called Sellars’ ‘sandwich.’ I have treated signification-
isomorphisms as functional ismorphisms between items in the space of reasons, but one could make the 
case that we should consider signification-isomorphisms to be in the offing whenever we classify an item 
in a foreign RS in terms of a dot-quoted sortal. One could even insist on this interpretation that the 
terms of a signification-isomorphism must be symbols having significance in the space of rationality. In 
the face of this semantic maneuver, however, I would insist that the cleavage between functional 
classification by dot-quotation and by functional-transitional articulation, described in sections 3 and 6 
of this essay, is of a far deeper kind than I had admitted. For I have tried to argue that Sellars embraces 
the existence of functional-transitional proprieties belonging to the causal realm—in robots, rats and 
record-players—and that these natural-functional systems are a precondition in the order of being for 
the possibility of picturing, which in turn is a precondition for the propriety of signifying. An 
interpreter who is determined to hold that signification is involved in any use of the dot-quotation 
device would have to accept that the device of dot-quotation is unsuited to the environment of the order 
of being. Rather, functional-transitional articulation would be seen as a mode of functional classification 
in the order of being, while dot-quotation would be a mode of functional classification in the order of 
knowing. In the remainder of this essay, however, I will ignore this interpretation and the details of its 
articulation. 
75 Sellars 1956 § 24. Cf. also 1969 § 63 
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depend in the order of being upon picturing relations. However, these picturing 
relations themselves depend in the order of being upon having a potential place in a 
natural-functional structure (e.g. an animal RS) that can serve as a mode of projection. 
7 Rationality and the Space of Reasons  
In the final paragraphs of “MEV,’ Sellars is at pains to show that he does not, in virtue 
of this extension of his functionalism, take the states of animal RSs (construed as natural-
linguistic objects) to be positions in the space of rationality. Amenability to functional 
characterization is not, for Sellars, a property that is coextensive with belonging to the 
realm of rationality. The intra-system transitions of animal RSs76 merely ape reason.77 
He does, however, take there to be intra-system transitions in animal RSs that we are to 
understand by analogy with logical inference, and even to be inference, for “such 
inferential patterns are uniformities in the occurrence of representational states.”78 This 
last claim is surprising—surely an inference is not merely the sequential occurrence of 
thoughts or representational states; surely an inference is the sort of thing that is subject 
to rules. Sellars’ claim that inferences are uniformities, however, does not entail that they 
are merely uniformities, nor that all suitable uniformities are inferences. The inferential 
patterns to which Sellars is referring are uniformities in sequences of representational 
states of animal RSs that constitute an animal’s strategy for finding a represented object.79 
These patterns, however, have been selected for in the evolutionary and personal history 
of the animal RS (in normal circumstances80 ). In short, the uniformities in question 
constitute pattern-governed behavior. They are therefore not ‘merely’ causal 
uniformities, but uniformities that are subject to conditions of correctness of the kind 
expressed by rules of criticism. 
The story that Sellars tells in “MEV” about the difference between animal and 
rational RSs is that rational RSs are ‘logical,’ whereas non-rational RSs are ‘pre-logical.’ 
By way of illustration Sellars explains that 
                                                 
76 Sellars 1981b introduces the term Humean RS to describe what I have been calling (merely) animal 
RSs, and Aristotelian RS to describe rational RSs (§§ 85ff). Since I already have vocabulary in play in this 
essay that functions as these terms do, I will forego their use in the main text. 
77 Sellars 1981b § 90  
78 Sellars 1981b § 67 
79 Cf. Sellars 1981b § 66–67 
80 And though I will not articulate it here, I expect that an analysis of the phrase ‘normal circumstances’ 
for phylogenetic and ontogenetic development here is in the offing which is similar in essentials to 
Sellars’ analysis of ‘normal conditions’ for perception in his 1956. The gist being: normal circumstances 
are just those circumstances in which the patterns of an RS are those that were selected for. 
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inferences involved in a pre-logical RS have the form which is illustrated by 
the sequence 
•Smoke here•, •fire nearby• 
but not illustrated by 
•If smoke anywhere, then fire nearby there• 
•Smoke here• 
•Fire nearby•81 
Logical RSs, on the other hand, have transitions that can be characterized by either sort 
of illustrative sequence.82 The upshot of Sellars’ illustration is that what he calls logical 
RSs have ‘standing’ representational states (like •If smoke anywhere, then fire nearby 
there•) that function as rules of inference,83 and these standing states represent intra-
system transitions of the RS itself.84 Standing states like the one in the above passage by 
mentioning statement-kinds. Thus it would be within the spirit of the Sellarsian 
apparatus to claim that the standing state in the above passage can be rephrased 
•(The •Smoke here•)s entail (the •fire nearby•)s•85 
The essential point, as I take it, is that rational (logical) RSs are those that represent their 
own functional transitions, whereas non-rational RSs do not. But logical RSs don’t 
represent their own transitional proprieties for the sake of redundancy; they represent 
their transitional proprieties so that those proprieties can become objects of scrutiny. In 
connection with the development of human children, Sellars explains that 
The child begins at the ‘pattern governed’ level of verbal behavior but 
subsequently becomes a full-fledged member of the linguistic community 
and thinks thoughts (theoretical and practical) not only about non-
linguistic items… At this later stage, he can not only reason in accordance 
with entailments, he can reason about entailments.86 
                                                 
81 Sellars 1981b § 85. The original passage uses single-quotes instead of dot-quotes, but the passage 
follows § 76n8 in which Sellars states his intention to “use ordinary quotes in place of dot-quotes” for 
the remainder of the essay. 
82 Sellars 1981b § 89 
83 Ibid. Cf. also Sellars 1954 §§ 25–29 
84 Cf. Sellars 1953 
85 The parentheses are strictly unnecessary. However, since dot-quotes do not come in typographically 
distinct opening and closing varieties, the parentheses are included to make the expression easier to read. 
86 Sellars 1973 § 32 
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Animals, like children, are endowed with RSs whose transitions are pattern-governed in 
Sellars’ sense. However, unlike animals, human children have the ability to represent not 
only their physical environment but their own intra-linguistic transitions. That is to say, 
human RSs are capable of containing representation states that function not only as 
sentences (e.g. ‘•this is triangular•’), but as propositions (e.g. ‘•the •this is triangular••’). 
The property of animal representational states that prevents them from 
occupying real estate in the space of reasons is that the RSs to which they belong (animal 
RSs) is that they do not represent their own functional transitions. As a consequence, 
animals can infer in accordance with rules, but they cannot infer about rules. All their 
meta-inferences are, so to speak, handled by their evolutionary and personal history. It 
is the second-level capacity to infer about inferences that enables an RS to be rational, 
and for its representations to be in the space of reasons. The space of reasons is the space 
of “justifying and being able to justify what one says.”87 The representational states of 
pre-logical RSs are not states in this space, because such RSs are not able to justify what 
they say, or what they think, or what they represent. 
Of course, in characterizing states of animal RSs as •this is triangular•s, we are 
characterizing them such that certain justificatory connections become salient to us. But 
we do not, merely through the use of dot-quotation, give place to the states of the animal 
RS in the space of reasons; we merely help ourselves to an analogy with states of language 
that occupy places in the space of reasons. Nothing of significance for the state of the rat 
follows from our ability to understand it by analogy with inferentially-articulated states. 
Even the significance of empirical descriptions, which are the paradigmatic contrast-class 
to states in the space of reasons,88 is made perspicuous through analogy to the inferential 
proprieties of an analogous belief-state. Thus I understand that if the chalk is released it 
will fall, because I recognize the inferential propriety of inferring the consequent from 
the antecedent. Sellars’ willingness to describe states of a rat’s RS as •this is triangular•s 
does not bely his expectation that the rat can justify its φ-state; the dot-quotation in this 
context is merely an illustrative shorthand, licit within a certain contextual frame, for the 
natural-functional transitions governing the rat’s representations. Sellars does not expect 
the rat’s •this is triangular•s to count as full-blooded inhabitants of the space of reasons 
unless he expects to find them accompanied by •the •this is triangular••s. 
                                                 
87 Sellars 1956 § 36 
88 Cf. the key passage in Sellars 1956 § 36 
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8 Concluding 
My aim was to produce a sketch of Sellars’ functionalism that, while sometimes 
schematic and dogmatic, illuminates in a relatively perspicuous fashion the Sellarsian 
case for cognitive functionalism. Language is a system of rules for the use of expressions, 
but these rules are normative in the subtle sense that rules of criticism (‘ought-to-be’ 
rules) are normative. Rules of criticism need not be observed through intentional action, 
but can be observed by pattern-governed behavior, or behavior that has been selected 
for. I then reviewed the two modes of functional classification that Sellars discusses. The 
first involves the articulation of proprieties of patterns of language-entry, intra-linguistic 
and language-exit transitions. The second mode, utilizing the device of dot-quotation, 
involves the formation of a functional sortal based on a familiar exemplar, and is parasitic 
on the possibility of the first mode of classification. The later Sellars recognized that if 
the basis for functional classification is ultimately a system of pattern-governed 
transitions, then functional systems (and systems to which dot-quotation can in 
principle be applied) are not coextensive with rational systems of representation. 
One of the critical pillars of this account of cognitive functionalism is Sellars’ 
notion of pattern-governed behavior. Not much was said in the foregoing in defense of 
Sellars’ commitment to pattern-governed behavior and its ability to do all that he needs 
it to. On the reading offered here, pattern-governed behavior must be a robust and 
relatively basic metaphysical notion, capable of distinguishing the teleological behavior 
of natural organisms from the regular movements of physical bodies. Furthermore, 
pattern-governed behavior must not only be capable of satisfying but, in some 
circumstances, of generating rules of criticism. Since Ruth Millikan’s work89 is on just 
this topic, however, the rigorous evaluation of the notion of pattern-governed behavior 
takes one quite afield of Sellars. 
I hoped to show that a Sellarsian science of cognition need not succumb to the 
Myth of the Given, and that the elements of Sellars’ account of representation that 
worry some of his interpreters are consequences of Sellars’ early views. Sellars’ account 
of representation is the exploration of what is, in his ‘synoptic vision,’ a stable middle-
ground between merely causal processes and full-blown rational states. This Sellarsian 
middle-ground is neither an abstruse topic in the philosophy of language nor a 
metaphysical error, but a precondition of the possibility of a cognitive science that is 
appropriately deferential to the hazards of the mind-body problem. 
                                                 
89 Millikan (1984) explores the possibility of regimenting the case for notions (e.g. that of a ‘proper 
function’) that fulfill the role that ‘pattern-governed behavior’ has in Sellars’ thought.  
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